Judicial Accountability and the Lokpal Debate: SCLHR's Postcard

The Background 

The Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 was introduced to investigate corruption among public officials, but whether it applies to High Court judges is debated. The Supreme Court recently stayed an order asserting Lokpal jurisdiction over certain judges, reinforcing judicial resistance to external oversight.

Under Articles 121 and 211, Parliament and state legislatures cannot discuss a judges conduct except in impeachment by proceedings (Article 124(4)).

However, no judge has ever been impeached due to the complex process. In K. Veeraswami v. Union of India (1991), the Supreme Court ruled that judges could be prosecuted for corruption with presidential sanction, but institutional reluctance has limited its application. The judiciary's in-house inquiry mechanism (C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee, 1995) lacks transparency and enforceability, raising concerns about self-regulation.

Judicial Accountability in India

The existing judicial accountability framework in India is largely self-regulatory, relying on in-house mechanisms rather than independent oversight. The judiciary has resisted external accountability mechanisms on the ground that judicial independence is paramount.

The current framework consists of:

 1. Impeachment Process: As per Article 124(4), a judge can only be removed by a complex impeachment process requiring a majority in both Houses of Parliament. This process is highly political and has never led to a judge’s removal.

 2. In-House Inquiry Mechanism: Established in R. Rathinam v. Union of India (2000), this mechanism allows the Chief Justice of India to handle complaints against judges. However, the reports of these inquiries are not binding or made public.

 3. Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill (Pending): This bill sought to establish a formal complaint and investigation procedure but remains stalled.

This system has faced criticism for being opaque and ineffective, as it fails to inspire public confidence in judicial accountability.

Point of View: Judicial accountability is important

While judicial independence is crucial, it must not lead to unaccountability. The current system, where judges oversee their peers, creates a conflict of interest. An independent oversight mechanism is necessary to ensure accountability without compromising judicial autonomy.

South Africa’s Judicial Service Commission Act, 1994 provides a model for reform. Its Judicial Conduct Committee (JCC) allows complaints against judges, with serious cases referred to an independent Judicial Conduct Tribunal. This system ensures transparency without executive interference, unlike India’s opaque in-house mechanism.

India could establish a National Judicial Complaints Commission, comprising retired judges, legal experts, and civil society representatives, to handle allegations of judicial misconduct. Even in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2015), the Supreme Court acknowledged the need for judicial accountability but failed to propose an alternative.

Another significant issue is the absence of statutory consequences for judicial misconduct apart from impeachment. Minor transgressions often go unpunished, eroding public faith in the judiciary.

Judges, like all public officials, derive their power from the people and must be subject to checks and balances.

Jeremy Bentham‘s emphasis on transparency as a safeguard against corruption highlights the need for judicial oversight. Judges wield significant authority over citizens rights and liberties, and unchecked power risks judicial absolutism.

Judicial independence should not imply infallibility. Public trust legitimizes authority, and a lack of external oversight risks eroding credibility. A structured accountability system would reinforce, not weaken, judicial independence, ensuring judges uphold constitutional ideals while remaining answerable to the public.